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ABSTRACT:  In the following pages, some light will hopefully be shed into the recent 
proposals of interconstitutionality and transconstitutionalism – deemed highly influential among  
Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries – considering them against the backdrop defined by 
the more general disquisitions recently devoted to interculturality and transculturality in their 
quality of practical responses to the globalization and social differentiation phenomena. 
Acknowledging the fact that, even inside the juridical linguistic game and within the juristic 
community of interpreters, the new narratives interwoven through the above mentioned concepts 
are becoming more and more intricate – v.g., including epistemic and normative, as well as 
subjective and objective perspectives, giving birth to new elaborate semantic networks and covering 
an ever growing territory – it is important to admonish, at the outset, that, in this stance, we 
cannot but provide a preliminary and provisory map of the vast continent thereby comprised. As 
a consequence, the present text will limit itself to the signalling of some landmarks and the rough 
drawing of the basic lineaments for further (and certainly wiser and more competent) cartographic 
and exploratory endeavours. 
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I. Social Constitutional Law, Institutions and Culture 
1. The great challenges facing law, legal studies and lawyers/jurists in the first 
decades of this XXI century do not seem to grant us the serenity of vita 
contemplativa in academic marble towers; they rather demand  a practical and 
normative compromise with a more righteous, correct, just and better world.   
Over the past few years, my own modest commitment to the irrecusable Kampf 
um Recht und Rechtwissensschaft of our times, led me to delve into the juridical 
institutionalization of the normative project of social justice, as assumed by law and enacted 
in republican terms (that surpass a mere judicial – adjudicatory – enforcement), 
attempting to assess it from a jusconstitutional perspective, particularly focused on 
the specific societal sphere structured around healthcare.  
Drawing on inter- and trans-disciplinary achievements - spurred, among other 
things, by the recent and widely acclaimed cultural and institutional turns – I have 
been striving to outline the essential features of what could be regarded as a new 
common1 public social law with constitutional aspirations, anchored in social rights 
(and their institutional assumptions and projections), increasingly formed via 
                    ___________________________ 
▪This article was submitted and accepted to be presented at the Training School on International 
Law Between Pluralism and Constitutionalism, organized by CEDU (Centre of Studies in 
European Union  Law, University of Minho) within COST Action 1003, in 2012, under the theme 
International Law Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation. The text still bears the marks 
of those origins and primeval intentions. Despite the natural evolutions and changes that my own 
thought has suffered in the meantime, the preference was to keep the article largely untouched, 
with exceptions made to a set of graphics and schemes that it originally contained (as anexes), but 
were hereby suppressed, unfitted as they seemed to this space.    
 For clarifications purposes, it could be added that the original paper was born at the crossroads of 
two broader research projects. The first one concerns my PhD investigations on the juridical 
realization of social justice in healthcare systems, and the second one consists of a comparative and 
historical analysys of constitutional experiences (Icelandic, Turkish, Israeli, Napolitan), located 
somehow at the margins of  the mainstream constitutional thought, a study which was envisaged as 
a means to test and filter theoretical postulates cogitated and propugnated, over the past few years, 
on matters of inter- and trans- culturality and constitutionality . Some aspects of these perquiritions 
naturally overlap, because my PhD studies tend to nurture all other reflections and reap the fruits 
resulting therefrom. Further and detailed developments on the subject hereby explored will thus 
hopefully be found in my final dissertation. Nevertheless, they can already be glimpsed in articles 
published in the meantime, especially in “Breves apontamentos sobre o Direito Constitucional da 
República da Turquia. Contributo para uma recompreensão inter- e trans-cultural da 
jusconstitucionalidade contemporânea? (1.ª Parte)”, in Boletim da Faculdade de Direito da 
Universidade de Coimbra, Vol. XXXVIII, Tomo II, pp. 727-787; “Breves apontamentos sobre o 
Direito Constitucional da República da Turquia. Contributo para uma recompreensão inter- e 
trans-cultural da jusconstitucionalidade contemporânea? (3.ª Parte)”, in Boletim da Faculdade de 
Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, Vol. LXXXIX, Tomo II, 2013 , pp. 721-748. I also had the 
oportunity to return to these issues in three recent presentations: «Inter- e transconstitucionalidade 
como expressão e factor de inter- e transculturalidade: subsídios para uma reconsideração da teoria 
e do direito constitucionais?» (at the IV Colóquio Macrofilosófico e I Colóquio sobre 
Interconstitucionalidade, organized by CEDU - University of Minho, the University of Barcelona 
and the University Autónoma de Barcelona) and «Inter- e transconstitucionalidade como expressão 
e factor de inter- e transculturalidade: concurso para um projecto jurídico-políticamente 
transformador?» (at the Workshop "Interconstitucionalidade: teoria e hemenêutica", held at CEDU, 
University of Minho), and «Proto-direitos sociais e controlo jurídico-político da constitucionalidade 
na República Napolitana (1799). Reflexões sobre a sancionabilidade do direito social, a partir do 
projecto constitucional de Francesco Mario PAGANO» (1.º Encontro de Doutorandos do 
Instituto Jurídico, at the Faculty of Law of the University of Coimbra). 
1  Mireille DELMAS-MARTY, Pour un droit commun, Seuil, Paris, 1994; IDEM, Trois défis pour un droit 
mondial, Seuil, Paris, 1998; in Portugal, v. Eduardo Vera-Cruz PINTO, História do direito comum da 
humanidade: ius commune humanitatis ou lex mundi?, Volume I., Tomo I., AAFDL, Lisboa, 2003 and 
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complex processes of intercultural communication, but also shaped (eventually) by 
transcultural (shared) grounds, reclaiming therefore an urgent reconsideration of the 
Cultural Theories of Law2. 
For the current purpose, some of the main problematical knots formed by the 
themes addressed in my research –  e.g. social justice, republicanism, 
constitutionality, etc. - can be unfolded and primarily displayed along three lines of 
research, continuously challenged by globalization, whose shock waves seriously 
complicate the discharging of the nuclear reflective tasks incumbent upon us: a) 
first of all, the re-foundation and theorization of social juridicity, as the juridical 
precipitation of social justice - whilst accounting for the diversified means of its 
instantiation (namely through organizational, procedural and functional juridical 
arrangements, conflict laws and reflexive regulation) - and ultimately aiming for a 
clarification of sociality (as an object, content, and mission of law, more than simply 
its condition and ground); b) secondly, the determination of public law’s 
specificity, distilling the particular meaning and idea of juridical publicness3 from the 
vast array of traditional publicization  criteria of law, through an exercise of 
philosophical and historical reconstitution of its foundations4; c) thirdly, the 
reconstruction of constitutional law as a relatively autonomous field inside the 
juridical system – due to its particular meaning and rationality, history, 
foundations, contents and functions5 - and the decantation of the (hypothetical...) 
new social public law constitutionality  by means of scrupulous distinctions between 
                    ___________________________ 
2 V. for example, Berhnard LOSCH, Kulturfaktor Recht: Grundwerte - Leitbilder - Normen. Eine 
Einführung, UTB, Böhlau Verlag, Köln, 2006; Roger COTTERRELL, Law, Culture and Society: Legal 
Ideias in the Mirror of Social Theory, Ashgate, Burlington, 2006; David NELKEN, “Using the concept 
of legal culture”, in Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 2004; Robin WEST, “Literature, Culture 
and Law”, in Georgetown Law: The Scholarly Commons, 2008; Lawrence ROSEN, Law as Culture. An 
Invitation, Princeton University Press, 2006; Wolfgang FIKENTSCHER, Law and Anthropology: 
Outlines, Issues, Suggestions, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften - Abhandlungen, München, 
Verlag C.H. Beck in Kommission, 2008; Norbert ROULAND, Nos Confins do Direito, Martins 
Fontes, São Paulo, 2003; Paul KAHN, “Freedom, Autonomy and the Cultural Study of Law”, in 
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, 13, 2001, pp. 141-171; Naomi MEZEY, “Law as Culture” in 
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, 13, 2001, pp. 35-67; Peter HÄBERLE, Verfassungslehre als 
Kulturwissenschaft. Schriften zum offentlichen Recht (spanish translation: Teoria de la Constitución como ciência 
de la cultura, Tecnos, Madrid, 2000); IDEM, “Der Sinn von Verfassungen in 
kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht”, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 131, 2006, pp. 621 and ff.; IDEM, 
“Verfassung als Kultur”, in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart. Neue Folge, 2001, V. 49, pp. 
125-143; Pablo Lucas VERDÚ, “Ultima lección académica del profesor Pablo Lucas Verdu con 
motivo de su jubilación anticipada el 20 de mayo de 1988”, in Revista de Derecho Político, núm. 27-28, 
1988, pp. 9-22; IDEM, Teoría de la Constitución como Ciencia Cultural, 2.ª edición, corregida y 
aumentada, Dykinson, Madrid, 1998; Jack BALKIN, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology, Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London, 1998; Mark van HOECKE, Law as Communication, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2002; Miguel REALE, Filosofia do Direito, 19.ª edição 3.ª tiragem, Saraiva, São 
Paulo, 2002.  
3 See, for all: Armin von BOGDANDY/ Philipp DANN/ Matthias GOLDMANN, “Developing 
the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance 
Activities”, in German Law Journal, Vol. 9, 2008, pp. 1375-1400. 
4 R.C. Van CAENEGEN, Uma Introdução Histórica ao Direito Constitucional Ocidental, Fundação 
Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 2007; Maurizio FIORAVANTI, Constitución. De la Antigüedad a nuestros 
dias, Editorial Trotta, Madrid, 2007; Olivier BEAUD, “L’Histoire du Concept de Constitution en 
France. De la Constitution Politique à la Constitution comme Statut Juridique de L’État”, in Jus 
Politicum. Revue de droit politique, n.º 2, 2010, pp. 31-59; Gerhard STOURZH, “Constitution: 
Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early 17th to the late 18th Century, in T. H. BALL/ J. 
G. A. POCOCK (Eds.), Conceptual Change and the Constitution, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 
1988, pp. 35 and ff.; Rogério SOARES, “O Conceito Ocidental de Constituição”, in Revista de 
Legislação e de Jurisprudência, n.ºs 3743 e 3744. 
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constitution, constitutionalism (as a political movement), constitutionalization (taken as a 
process) and constitutionality - with the latter being used to designate the constitutional 
normativity (understood in its quid, eidos, ousia or noetic/noematic content)6.  
 
2. In a global setting, characterized by strong individualization, privatization and 
politico-juridical fragmentation, it seems unnecessary to highlight how many and how 
big are the obstacles and resistance encountered, each and every time one attempts  
to uphold a critical rehabilitation and reinvention of juridical sociality, publicity and 
constitutionality. 
Sociality appears to have retreated, gradually receding from substantive to 
procedural/ discursive (J. HABERMAS), and then conflict regions of law (C. 
JOERGES), to find its last refuge in mere reflexive juridicity (K-H. LADEUR). And 
yet, social rights and principles, duties and responsibilities remain constitutive 
grounds and regulative ideals of law, in spite of all the new juridical configurations 
generated by fruitful synergies between different generations of rights, the 
entwinement of solidarity, sustainability and subsidiarity, and the return of responsibility 
(individual and collective, internal and external)7. 
Publicness appears somehow diluted in the all-encompassing privatized and 
economically functionalized global administrative law8 whose rapid dissemination 
tends to obliterate the central, constitutive and politically foundational role of all 
public law.   
In regards to constitutional law, these problems assume even bigger 
proportions. Nevertheless, the crisis of national constitutions (torn apart by 
endogenous and exogenous forces), the uncertainties of constitutional theory and 
the obsolescence and impotency of constitutionalism ended up giving way to a new 
constitutional momentum, marked by the emergence of numerous trends (v.g. global, 
societal, multi-level, cooperative, commonwealth or neo-constitutionalisms). 
Clearly, constitutionality and contitutionalness stand at the crossroads, caught in 
between contrasting views and contradictory movements, like pan-constitutionalist 
euphoria and constitutional melancholy, scepticism or even cynicism9.  
Without contempt for Rainer Wahls’s brilliant remarks concerning the empirical 
social and political conditions for constitutional effectiveness10, and 
notwithstanding Dieter Grimm’s always incisive and enlightening observations 
about our current constitutional reality11, constitutions still matter12, as irreplaceable 
media for collective self-representation and projection, as well as for  intra- and 
                    ___________________________ 
6 Allow me to recall that the efforts required in order to fulfil the demands of the abovementioned 
public and constitutional law project of social justice within the different societal arenas (J. 
ELSTER), contexts (R. FORST), campus (P. BOURDIEU), spaces (L. BOLTANSKI), spheres (M. 
WALZER) or subsystems (N. LUHMANN) can be clearly illustrated with the case of healthcare 
which has generated its own geographically global but functionally partial societal constitution (G. 
TEUBNER). 
7 Just think of the consistent contributions from authors such as R. Arango, A. Supiot, C. M. 
Herrera, I. Sarlet, U. Vollkmann, M. Krennerich, E. Eischenhoffer, F. Michellman, W. Forbath, R. 
West, K. Young (to name but a few). 
8 Benedict KINGSBURY/ Nico KRISCH/Richard B. STEWART, "The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law", Law and Contemporary Problems, 68, 2005.   
9 Caused by Entkonstitutionalisierung (HÖFFE) or Deconstituzionalizzazione (DUSO) processes. 
10 “Konstitutionalisierung – Leitbegriff oder Allerweltsbegriff?” in Carl-Eugen/ Martin Ibler/ 
Dieter Lorenz (Hrsg.), Der Wandel des Staates vor den Herausforderungen der Gegenwart, Festschrift für 
Winfried Brohm zum 70. Geburtstag, Beck, München, 2002, pp. 191 – 207. 
11 See, for example, Dieter GRIMM, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization”, in 
Constellations, Volume 12, No 4, 2005, pp. 447-463. 
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inter- societal relationships13.  Constitutionality embodies a particular meaning14, 
rationality15 and perspective or mindset16, with normative17 material18 contents (scilicet, 
goods, principles, rights and norms)19, which is practically revealed and 
continuously performed20 – although only gradually or incrementally21  -  not only 
under, but also besides, behind or beyond the traditional formal constitutional 
documents; it is as though it was partially or entirely detached from the usual 
constitutionalist processes and constituent powers, in a strange morphogenesis22 that 
is growing in complexity from day to day. The main problem, in this case, 
concerns the relation between politics and law, democracy and juridicity and the 
                    ___________________________ 
13 Since they can design a common normative horizon, punctuated by institutions able to generate capabilities of 
action and interaction, according to Ulrich PREUß, “Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is 
global Constitutionalism a viable concept?”, in Martin LOUGHLIN/Petra DOBNER, The twilight 
of constitutionalism?, op. cit., pp. 23-46. 
14 Günther TEUBNER, “A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of 'Hitting the Bottom'”, in Poul 
KJAER/Gunther TEUBNER/ Alberto FEBBRAJO (eds.), Financial Crisis in Constitutional 
Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation, Hart, Oxford, 2011, pp. 9-51; IDEM, “Societal 
Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?”, in Christian JOERGES/ 
Inger-Johanne SAND/ Gunther TEUBNER (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitucionalism, 
Hart, Oxford, 2004, pp. 3- 28; IDEM, “Constitutionalising Polycontexturality”, in Social and Legal 
Studies, 19, 2010, pp. 17-38. 
15 Neil WALKER, “Taking Constitutionalism beyond the State”, in Political Studies, Vol. 56, 2008, 
pp. 519-543. 
16 Martti KOSKENNIEMI, “Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About 
International Law and Globalization”, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 8, 1, 2006, pp. 9–36. 
17 Thomas COTTIER/ Maya HERTIG, “The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism”, in 
Max Planck UNYB, 2003, pp. 261-328; 
18 Anne PETERS, “Global Constitutionalism in a Nutshell”, in: Klaus DICKE/Stephan 
HOBE/Karl-Ulrich MEYN/Anne PETERS/Eibe RIEDEL/Hans-Joachim SCHÜTZ/Christian 
TIETJE (Eds), Weltinnenrecht: Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück (Veröffentlichungen des Walther 
Schücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, Band 155), Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 2005; IDEM, “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 19, 2006, 
pp. 579-610; IDEM, “Transnational Law Comprises Constitutional, Administrative, Criminal, and 
Quasiprivate Law”, in: Pieter BEKKER/Rudolf DOLZER/Michael WAIBEL (Eds), Making 
Transnational Law Work: Liber Amicorum Detlev Vagts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, 
pp. 154-173; Jan KLABBERS/ Anne PETERS/ Geir ULFSTEIN, The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (expanded paperback edition with new epilogue), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011.  
19 In a thick description, occidental constitutions still withold some functional and substantive 
definition or predicative elements, for they are engaged with the legitimation, taming and control of 
state and new societal powers, conforming social and political life in the name of human dignity, 
pluralistic democracy, fundamental rights (including social ones), separation of powers, 
independendece of the judiciary power and the courts, rule of law and Rechtstaat (P. HÄBERLE).  
20 «Constitutional authority is in part derived from the constitutional principles it claims to 
instantiate and give concrete shape to. (…) The normative presuppositions of constituionalism are 
translated directly into a set of basic formal, jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive legal 
principles that are conceived as underlying existing legal and political practices and in light of which 
that practice can be reconstructed and assessed». Matthias KUMM, “The Best of Times and the 
Worst of Times. Between Constitutional Triumphalism and Nostalgia”, in Martin LOUGHLIN/ 
Petra DOBNER (ed.), The twilight of constitutionalism?, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 
2009, pp. 201-219; IDEM, Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the 
Relationship between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State’ in Jeffrey DUNOFF/Joel 
TRACHTMAN (Eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance, 
CUP, 2009, pp. 264 and ff.  
21 Thomas COTTIER/ Maya HERTIG, “The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism”, op. cit, 
and Neil WALKER, “Taking Constitutionalism beyond the State”, op. cit.  
22 Riccardo PRANDINI, “The Morphogenesis of Constitutionalism”, in Martin 
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empirical and normative dimensions of constitutionality as a specific kind of 
effective normative validity23.  
 
3. Considerations of such a kind inevitably force us to dive into deeper waters, 
undertaking general inquiries about law itself.  
As a matter of fact, in the new globalized scenario marked by axiological, 
epistemic, functional and geographical differentiation and pluralism, they prompt 
us to lucubrate on the mutually constitutive dialectic between normative validity and 
social problems, which lays at the heart of all living law, including the social one, thence 
calling out for an attentive review of its: a) rationality, conditions, foundation, 
content and functions; b) modus of existence (as an ought which is), normative 
modalities - subjective (social rights) and objective (social principles and criteria)24 -
, sources and dogmatic coagulations (as a system); c) and also methodology (the 
logoi and methods involved in its realization)25.  
At the same time, with the scope of revalorizing the alternatives to the judicial 
Rechtsgewinnung (not disregarding its undisputed centrality)26, they ask for a careful 
study of the relations among law, its individual and collective subjects (both as 
addressees and authors), their actions, and the social reality (structurally, intentionally 
and problematically envisioned), taking the multispaciality of the Weltinnenraum (P. 
Sloterdijk) brought about by globalization as topological reference. 
Thus, in this light, engaged in a quest both for the general and specific 
(concrete) meaning of social justice and its practical modes of enactment, it suffices to 
say, at this point, that one of the major problems that we have to deal with is the 
need to reconcile individual and collective subjectivities (more and more volatile, 
hybridized and nomadic), with institutions (increasingly eroded, corrupted and 
liquefied), at least if we persist in restoring the profound significance of social 
responsibilities, general interests, public and shared spaces and common goods.  
But in the liquid world of polymorphic subjects which often sail  adrift, this goal 
can be only attained - and our compromise to social justice thereby honoured - 
appealing – primarily  to fundamental  human   rights and social liberties (broadly 
considered) and emphasizing the importance of their institutional guaranties 
(Einrichtungsgarantien) and normative projections27. Effectively, social rights – 
recognized within several juridical constellations or galaxies -  should be 
approached archeoteleologically or teleonomologically, as the groundwork for a 
Verantwortungsrecht, which is an Aufgaberecht of values and ends - for they convey 
goods (juridically delineated as entitlements), whilst assigning tasks which demand 
positive actions of fulfilment (facilitation, promotion, realization)28; moreover, they 
                    ___________________________ 
23 Modern constitutionality is unthinkable without some form of empirical connection to the real 
will of people as a political constituency (and its propper procedures of formation and expression). 
But democracy, for its part, has also become a normative principle, grounded on normative 
assumptions, and thus constitutionally guaranteed. An interesting analysis of the problem is 
displayed in Neil WALKER, “Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative 
Relationship”, University of Edinburgh - School of Law Working Paper Series, No 2010/25, Edinburgh, 
2010.  
24 In this particular case. 
25 This sistematization is obviously indebted to the jurisprudentialist school of juridical thought 
developed in the Faculty of Law of Coimbra, by Castanheira Neves and his disciples, F. Pinto 
Bronze and J. M. Aroso Linhares.     
26 Niklas LUHMANN, Das Recht der Geselsschaft, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M., 1995, pp. 297 
and ff.  
27 Social responsibilities, solidarity duties, obligations to respect, to protect and fulfil, etc.  
28 Something which can be adapted from the capabilities approach of M. NUSSBAUM and A. 
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should also be considered in their – apparently oxymoronic - institutional 
intentionality, which aims to overcome the barriers between Lifeworld and System, as 
well as between dogmatic stabilization and critically reflexive (and dynamising) 
performance (of binding normative missions). It is useless (if not dangerous) to 
postulate holistic models of society, with reference to a clear, discernible and 
normatively consequent common good (Gemeingut). However, the sheer individualism 
at the basis of a contractual comprehension of law, exclusively reliant on 
commutative justice, inevitably contradicts the grounds, contents and functions of 
social rights, impoverishing the complexity of social justice. That is why, in my 
view, we could (and should) align human and fundamental rights with the scales of 
justice of N. FRASER, i.e., conceiving of them as instantiations and sources of 
recognition, redistribution and participation.  
 
4. Accordingly, social rights29  seem to me as the best choice to constitute the 
cornerstone of an emergent new ius gentium socialis30, able to offer the established body of 
legal insight correspondent to the accepted wisdom about the law of nations and operating 
effectively in positive and critical modes, both as inspiration for domestic law and as aspiration for 
a uniform body of transnational law, operating effectively in both positive and critical modes (J. 
Waldron)31.  
In order to support such a proto-constitutionalised transnational public social 
law we must commit ourselves to an enterprise of empirical investigation and 
normative justification composed of three basic endeavours – historical, 
comparative and ethical – which can generate a constitutively transformative 
exposure to alterity and difference, also readable as an encounter with strangeness, 
an experience  of absence and the rehabilitation of alternatives32.  
These diachronic, synchronic, transcendent and/or transcendental exercises and 
their findings may be reassumed and synthesized within culture, taken, at first 
instance, as a Bezirkt (in heiddeggerian terms): a fertile territory for questioning 
                    ___________________________ 
29 Andreas FISCHER-LESCANO/Kolja MÖLLER, Der Kampf um globale soziale Rechte: Zart wäre das 
Gröbste, Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 2012; Roland KLAUTKE/Brigite OEHRLEIN (Hrsg.), Globale 
Soziale Rechte: Zur emanzipatorischen Aneignung universaler Menschenrechte, VSA Verlag, Hamburg, 2008; 
Thomas GIEGERICH/Andreas ZIMMERMANN, Wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte im 
globalen Zeitalter, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2008. In what concerns Europe and the UE, in 
special, v. Julia ILIOPOULOS-STRANGAS, “Soziale Grundrechte”, in Detlef MERTEN/ Hans 
Jürgen PAPIER (Hg.), Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa VI/1: Europäische 
Grundrechte I, Volume 6, CF. Müller, Hüthig Jehle Rehm, Heidelberg/ München/ Landsberg/ 
Frechen/ Hamburg, 2010, pp. 299 and ff.; Eberhard EICHENHOFER, “Soziale Rechte”, 
IBIDEM, pp. 825 and ff; Christine LANGENFELD, “Soziale Grundrechte”, IBIDEM, pp. 1117 
and ff.; Thorsten KINGREEN, “Soziale Grundrechte” (§18), in Dirk EHLERS (Hrsg.), Europäische 
Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten, De Gruyter Lehrbuch, 3. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, 2009., pp. 640 
and ff.; Cécile FABRE, “Social Rights in European Constitutions”, in Gráinne de BÚRCA, Bruno 
de WITTE (Eds.), Social Rights in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 15-28. 
30 Of a meta-regulatory kind, according to some (N. WALKER, B. S. SANTOS). 
31 Jeremy WALDRON, “Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium”, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
119, No. 1, Nov. 2005, pp. 129-147; IDEM, "Ius Gentium: A Defense of Gentili's Equation of the 
Law of Nations and the Law of Nature" (2008), in New York University Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers. Paper 99: http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/99. 
32 I can think of several alternative strategies of ethical foundation/justification, stemming from the 
ethics of recognition (A. HONNETH, P. RICOEUR), to the ethics of psychanalisis (J. LACAN, F. 
DOLTO, J. KRISTEVA), passing through the ethics of discourse and communication (H.-O. 
APPEL/J. HABERMAS) , the ethics of alterity (E. LEVINAS, K. E. LØGSTRUP), difference (J. 
DERRIDA) or commitment (S. CRITCHLEY). On foundations of law, see, for all, U. 
ROTTHLEUHNER, Foundations of Law (Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume 





®UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 1, July 2015 
Z  
62                                                                                           Luís A. Malheiro Meneses do Vale 
 
 
meanings and their utterances (albeit not necessarily in a culturalist way), but, not 
least, to unveil and engender them through an exposure to (Da-sein) and care for the 
world (Sorge) and the others who share it with us (Mit-sein). To this purpose, a clear 
understanding of culture is of the essence, having much to benefit from the most 
recent studies on the subject, whatever the valence, dimension or significance they 
choose to privilege (structural, mental, functional, normative, behavioural, 
historical or topical).    
Admonished to the need of handling carefully the dangerous C-word, one must 
recall its richness, while, at the same time, trying to prevent some of the most 
frequent misinterprations that it permits. To that end, we rely on cultural studies and 
other scholarly traditions (based upon ancient, medieval and modern classics and 
specifically developed by authors like M. Arnold, T.S. Eliot, R. Williams, or - more 
recently - T. Eagleton, Z. Baumann, G. Lipovetsky, M. Antunes, E. P. Coelho, 
Bragança de Miranda, etc).  
 More than a simple concept, we should think of culture also as structure and praxis 
(Z. Baumann). Culture can mean a particular form of life, the activity and the 
result of aesthetic creation (with a peculiar transformative nomos, stressed by 
Marcuse) and a reference to critical utopia whether individual or collective (T. 
Eagleton). Thus, it always enables and constrains simultaneously - even in today’s 
liquid world (Z. Baumann) -, acting as an ideal and a boundary at the same time (R. 
Geuss).   
Culture combines memory, transformation and diversity, i.e. tradition, 
innovation and pluralism (Häberle). It does not restrict itself to high culture, or 
popular and mass culture, comprising, as well, marginal, alternative, sub-, anti- and 
counter-cultures.  
This is the place of antinomies and paradoxes dialectically energized, whereby 
identity and alterity have to dialogue, singularity and universality are short-
circuited, material and spiritual dimensions become substantially entangled. All 
these linkages and connections are mediated by man himself (and by his 
autonomous representations, projections and transfigurations). This is so, because 
of culture’s radical embodiment in human anthropological features, acting as a bridge 
between the somatic and the semiotic or symbolic; signalizing the conditions than 
enable us to transcend nature trough culture, to transcend culture through our 
individuation process, only to be confronted with the inner (or collective) 
unconscious, where the cultural projection of the super ego is shaped as the 
natural figure of the progenitor – the father – and  where the unspoken, ineffable 
and dark regions of our nature are said to have linguistic structures (J. Lacan).   
Strangers to ourselves (J. Kristeva), and estranged from the world (P. Sloterdijk) we 
come closer to the other, the stranger (S. Zizek, T. Eagleton). Distanced from 
ourselves and the world, displaced from our common ground, diverted from 
others, we are united in the experience of difference and enabled with the 
capability for difference, the ability to differentiate and to differ (J. Derrida); 
culture is all about founding, finding, producing, negotiating, transgressing and 
remaking principles and criteria of difference and sameness. Intrinsically dialectic, 
it presupposes divergence, which explodes in conflicts but allows productive 
communications.   
Post-metaphysical thinking is not necessarily dragged into the void, when 
construed upon the personal and social intervals (S. Lash), along the alluded 
fissures, in between the breaches of what were once the holistic thick conception 
of nation culture, the solid ontological notion of personal identity, and the 
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 Thus, culture is also about differences, strangeness, intervals, interstices, which 
undermine the totality of immanence thanks to the ontological and discursive 
possibility33 and ethical freedom, without which responsibility would not be 
thinkable or practiced; it offers the basic foundation and abyssal ground (Ab-grund) 
for possible binding projects, since it is the ultimate reason for radical 
attentiveness, responsiveness and positive hospitality towards the other (as 
principium of infinity and transcendence, requiring omissions and actions).  
As fertile ground, propitious arena and crossroad or axis between past, present 
and future, individual and collective, person and community, facts and values, it is 
the locus of mediations (inter), namely between men (intersubjectivity). But it is also 
transsubjective. 
Could we dare to assert that culture is inherently inter-cultural because of its 
intervals, interstices, intermediations, interconnections, intersubjective basis? Or 
that it is even (horizontally and vertically, figuratively speaking) trans-cultural, 
inasmuch as it surpasses itself, overwhelmed by an excess of presence, or driven by 
the positive impulse of absence and the appeal of the alternative?  
Whatever the answer is, culture interests us while it gives access to human self-
transcendence. As we will later see, it is always inter and transcultural in more than 
one sense. 
 
5.  The relationship between law and culture takes place at different levels - 
from the axiological to the ontological or the epistemological one. It is no wonder, 
then, that it has always attracted philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists or 
linguists throughout the times. This is not the place or time to disclose personal 
assumptions about the subject. It suffices to say, for now, that my reflections were 
nurtured by the works of very different authors, like D. Nelken or R. Cotterell, C. 
Geertz, D. Rosen, N. Rouland, and W. Fikentscher, R. Smend, H. Heller, P. 
Häberle, M. Reale, M. V. Hoecke, etc. These authors taught us that culture has its 
own  laws, that culture can become law (i.e. normatively binding), that cultural 
activities and products are objects of law’s protection and promotion; and that law, 
for its part, is also culture and part of culture(s), for it develops a partially 
autonomous culture and contributes to the more general cultural production and 
reproduction.   
Peter Häberle reminded us that democracy and the rule of law are cultural 
creations, integrating an archetype of political organization transformed in a 
civilizational heritage or legacy assumed and accepted with future pretensions – 
something to preserve and to improve, a nest of memories and hopes connected 
by responsibility: the responsibility of a holder and a performer. The constitution 
is the expression of a certain degree of cultural development, a way of self-
representation peculiar to a people, mirror of its cultural legacy and ground basis 
or foundation for its hopes and desires. Constitutions are, in form as in substance, 
an expression and an instrument of cultural mediation - receptive, reproductive, 
but also transformative (as a repository of future configurations, experiences, and 
knowledge).  
From the other side of the Atlantic, one can hear J. Balkin’s inspiring voice, 
stating that The constitution is a set of political institutions, a source of values and aspirations, 
a repository of cultural memory and a transgenerational political project.(... ). But if the 
                    ___________________________ 
33 Whose ethical corollary is R. Kearney’s non finalistic eschatology of justice – Richard KEARNEY, 
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Constitution belongs to the American people, it also helps constitute them as a people that persists 
over time. It does so by constituting a common project, a common past, and a common destiny34. 
However, if law is inter and trans-subjective, whilst radically based in inter- and 
trans- constitutive dimensions of culture itself, then it seems even more inter and 
transcultural when we take notice of horizontal constitutional dialogues, 
exchanges, mutual observations, reciprocal learning and dialectical transcendence - 
across countries, nations, languages, etc. As culture becomes intentionally and 
problematically intertwined, the self-transcendental conditions and self-
transcendent references of communities, collective subjects or inter- and trans-
individual realities (from Popper’s Third World), reveal themselves closer (to one 
another) than one would expect; something which evidently could not go without 
serious juridical implications.   
 Nevertheless, it is legitimate to ask if the normative reality of constitutional 
public social law can be thought of in such terms? If culture is not an answer but 
the possibility of a question, an explosion of meanings, providing explanations and 
justifications, rationally and reasonably - i.e., convincing, and thus recognizable as 
binding -, should constitutionality be seen as inter and transconstitucional?   
 My hypothesis is that inter and trans-culturality are practically stimulated by 
new international and transnational phenomena, but these only reinforce 
something already existent in any culture.  In my opinion, inter- and trans-
constitutionality highlight cultural-juridical differences while also creating bounds, 
approaching professionals, organizations, institutions, people and communities at 
an unprecedented pace. Some think pragmatically and consider that only 
contingent overlaps can result from these interactions. Others suggest that these 
synergies work out at other levels, allowing for normative justifications and 
important findings of valid and effective foundations and criteria. 
To maintain a realistic and prudent attitude in front of these empirical 
phenomena, there is no need to give up on questioning their deeper meaning. 
Perhaps an inter- and trans-cultural perspective can thoroughly depict and 
illustrate more accurately our current constitutional moment. I would even dare to 
suggest, that it could benefit from an appropriate embedding within a broader 
(though intentionally juridical) theory of inter- and transculturality. Human social 
rights and the public/common (as different from privatized and individualized) 
institutions inspired and informed by them, might emerge, then, as expressions of 
a reasonable project of justice, legitimating claims to binding authority, due to 
inter-cultural and transcultural foundations.  
 With that in view, we must start by giving a brief account of the new 
interconstitutional and transconstituional  theories.  
II. Interconstitutionality and Transconstitutionalism  
6. At least among Portuguese-speaking juridical literature, the expression 
interconstitutionality made its first, timid appearance, in a fascinating little book 
written by F. Lucas Pires (one of our European law pioneers), which bore an 
emblematic title: Introduction to Constitutional European Law. The year was 1997, and 
the reference made by the late professor was very brief, and allusive, almost 
ciphered (in P. Rangel’s words); nevertheless, it was interesting enough to be 
                    ___________________________ 
34 Jack BALKIN, “Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption”, in Constitutional Commentary, 
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caught in the radar of some scholars, such as João Loureiro35, who took notice of 
it, in  early 1999, drawing Paulo Rangel’s attention  to the subject36. 
For Paulo Castro Rangel, this theory does not aim to  overcome and supersede 
the idea or concept of constitution and the epistemic horizon it defines, envisioning 
the ambitious objective of giving birth to some sort of new constitutional theory, 
rooted on (and fed by) the dynamics of planetary constitutional life. Nevertheless, 
although keeping itself within the traditional canons of constitutional theory, it 
pleads for a renewal of the concept of constitution, which supposedly should no 
longer be associated with the State, but rather be adapted to the new post-
westphalian Lebenswelten37. The same is to preach for a shift of constitutional 
references – from the State to the more and more polymorphic notion of political 
community; a political community increasingly polyarchic, whose members wind up 
being plural persons, animated by several contradictory feelings of belonging, and 
socially framed and constructed by the multiple citizenship statutes that enable 
them to participate in different societal spheres. At the end of the day, Rangel 
favours a return to the theory of constitution and to constitutional law, though 
taken in a new interconstitutional conception.    
 
7. a). The new Denkfigur would have to wait for Gomes Canotilho to receive its 
much deserved development and elaboration. The Professor from Coimbra, 
masterfully recoiled it and worked it out, patiently carving and shaping the rough 
stone into a shining and more presentable little diamond, by building up a complete 
theory of interconstitutionality as interculturality, which came to be our major source of 
inspiration38.  
Taking into the right account the proliferation of constitutional paradigms, 
since the dawn of this new century, Gomes Canotilho soon expressed his 
preference for a theory of interconstitutionality to the detriment of other competing 
conceptions (such as multilevel,  cooperative, multidimensional or federalist 
constitutionalism ).  
Borrowing some of Paulo Rangels’ hermeneutic variations around Lucas Pires' 
work, Canotilho interconstitutionality theory dwells into the interconstitutional 
relations of competition, convergence, overlapping and conflict of manifold constitutions and several 
constituent powers within the same political space evoking, as historical precedents, the 
medieval landscape of juxtaposed jurisdictions, statutes, criteria and sources of law, 
and the more recent and vivid experience of federal states and confederations, 
                    ___________________________ 
35 To be more precise, João Loureiro had already used the term within a former project of PhD 
dissertation presented in Germany and inspired, at the time, by Karl Otto Apel’s Discourse Ethics.  
36 F. Lucas PIRES, Introdução ao Direito Constitucional Europeu, Almedina, Coimbra, 1997; Paulo 
Castro RANGEL, “Uma Teoria da «Interconstitucionalidade» (Pluralismo e Constituição no 
Pensamento de Francisco Lucas Pires), in Themis, ano I, n.º 2, 2000, pp. 127-151; J. J. Gomes 
CANOTILHO, Brancosos” e Interconstitucionalidade – Itinerários dos Discursos sobre a Historicidade 
Constitucional, Almedina, Coimbra, 2006; João LOUREIRO, “«É bom morar no azul»: a constituição 
mundial revisitada”, in Boletim da Faculdade de Direito, Volume 82, 2006, pp. 181-212. 
37 Paulo Castro RANGEL, “Uma Teoria da «Interconstitucionalidade» (Pluralismo e Constituição 
no Pensamento de Francisco Lucas Pires)”, op. cit.,  (sic). 
38 J. J. Gomes CANOTILHO, “Interkonstitutionalität und Interkulturalität”, in Alexander 
BLANKENAGEL/Ingolf PERNICE/Helmuth SCHULZE-FIELITZ (Hrsg.), Verfassung im 
Diskurs der Welt. Liber Amicorum für Peter Häberle zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 
2004, 83 s.); IDEM, Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição (Capítulo 3, do Título 3, da Parte V), 
Almedina, Coimbra, 7.ª edição, 2003; IDEM, Competência Intercultural e Interjusfundamentalidade – 
Master na Faculdade de Direito de Coimbra, polic. Coimbra, Ano lectivo 2008/2009); IDEM, 
“Estado de Direito e Internormatividade”, in Alessandra SILVEIRA (Coord.), Direito da União 
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with their inner articulation and interactions among States or States and 
Federation.  
Even though he originally had the EU in mind, the reach and range of his 
writings are potentially much wider. After all, under this theory, although 
preserving their autodescripitive and autoreferential functions, as well as their value, 
Constitutions are constrained to “leave the castle and descend into the net of constitutions 
and constituent powers” with different sources and legitimacies. Thus, the theory of 
interconstituionality can be described as a specific form of political and social 
interorganization. Nevertheless, were interconstitutionality to be looked upon 
from a mere interorganizational perspective and it would most certainly leave 
unexplained the powerful and valuable role of integration played by Constitutions. 
That is why it culminated in a theory of constitutional interculturality, at the hands of 
Canotilho, for whom interculture means precisely the sharing of culture, ideas, 
Weltanschauungen and visions about ourselves and the others.  Interconstitutional 
communication sets is feet on common principles that point out to the idea of 
cultural constitution and cultural constitutional state, as proposed by P. Häberle39.  
Interconstitutional interactions, exchanges, overlaps, entanglements and fusions 
bring about the problem of paradigm articulation. Linking paradigms inside the 
intercultural net then implies some sort of interparadigmaticity.  
Finally, interconstitutionality suggests moments of intertextuality and 
intersemioticity, in the sense that it does not dispense the investigation and 
discovery of a set of rules regarding the production and interpretation of 
constitutional texts and the discourses and social practices related to them; a 
methodological concern easily justified by the growing necessity to ensure 
comprehensive justice amidst plural communities where different conceptions of 
good are under dispute40. 
More recently, Canotilho expanded his theory, to capture the new schemes of 
interjuridicity, internormativity, interjusfundamentality and interjurisdictionality, 
developed at the European level. In point of fact, European internormativity 
demands the questioning of the viability and meaning of an alleged rule of law beyond 
the State, especially when compared to alternative regulatory proposals (like good 
governance)41.  
Bearing in mind that the rule of law reclaims not only the prevention of 
arbitrary use of power, by imposing binding rules, but also the creation of the 
necessary conditions for the transformation of these rules into constitutive 
dimensions of a true system of law (structured in a normative set of rules of action, 
conduct and control), Canotilho realizes that this new paradigm of rule of law, 
detached from the State, has been emptied of and that it seems indifferent (if not 
impermeable) to democratic and constitutional substance and material dimensions 
                    ___________________________ 
39 Constitutional culture leads back to the complex of attitudes, ideas, experiences, patterns of value, 
expectations, actions and objective conducts of citizens, plural groups and state organs, referred to 
the Constitution as Offentliches Prozess. Interculturality begins as a communicative partake of such 
values and ideas, concretely translated into non juridical forms, to end up making tendential 
normativization possible.  It is worthy to mention that despite this cultural tone (or flavour), 
Canotilho moved away from excessively particularized conceptions of culture taken as an 
integration concept (W. Brugger). Inscribed in one of the most inspiring constitutional lineages of 
constitutional law - having studied, together with Peter Häberle, under Konrad Hesse’s orientation 
(a notable disciple of Heller and Smend) -, he proposes a complex concept of culture, charged with 
intercultural dimensions (similarly postulated – without using the prefix inter - by Peter Häberle).  
40 See J. J. Gomes CANOTILHO, Direito Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição, op. cit.  




®UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 1, July 2015 
Z  
67                                                                                           Luís A. Malheiro Meneses do Vale 
 
 
of justice, based  on the protection of personal, democratic and social rights, as 
well as freedoms and guaranties42.  
Consequently, a disturbing question remains in the air: to know whether it is 
possible to conceive the transnational rule of law as a material axiological 
parametrical structure, standing above the different positive juridical orders 
normatively interlaced.   
b). Notice that authors like J. Tully, J. Habermas, and Boaventura Sousa 
Santos43 also walked along the wide path of interculturality, the first one advocating 
for a post-imperialist, high-enlightenment, dialogic and inclusive philosophy of 
human rights, the second one disserting about Der interkulturelle Diskurs über 
Menschenrechte, and the last one fighting for a counter-hegemonic policy of human rights 
served by a diatopical hermeneutic44.  
 
8. Directly influenced by Canotilho, the Brazilian Bruno Galindo45 also pleads 
for an intercultural theory of constitution, in order to cope with the transformations 
operated in constitutional law as a consequence of supranational integration within 
the EU and the Mercosul. His assessment is epistemic, electing, as object, the 
constitutional interculturalism phenomenon, whilst clearly differentiated from what he 
dubs Intercultural constitutionalism, since the latter encompasses the dialogue between 
the different cultures co-existing within a society (and is hence connected to the 
idea or ideal of a Culturally inclusive constitution) whereas the former implies the 
recognition of constitutional cultures diversity (whether from ideological, systemic, 
or national point of view) and projects a dialogic relationship between them, 
fostering each constitutional culture’s conscience of its own imperfection and the 
willingness to find out cooperative solutions. 
In a brief taxonomy, he delineates three dichotomies: from an ideological 
standpoint, social constitutional cultures can be liberal and social; from a systemic 
point of view, one can speak of civil law and common law constitutional cultures. 
Finally, he finds it possible to discern two constitutional cultures still in the process 
of formation: nihilistic and supranational.  
The intercultural theory of constitution hinges on the critical rationalism of 
Karl Popper and the Möglichkeitsdenken adduced by Peter Häberle, and therefore 
exhibits critical, open, pluralistic, universalistic and contextual theoretical 
credentials.  
  
                    ___________________________ 
42 IBIDEM. 
43 Boaventura de Sousa SANTOS, A Gramática do Tempo: para uma nova cultura política, Edições 
Afrontamento, 2006; Jürgen HABERMAS; “Der interkulturelle Diskurs über Menschenrechte”, in 
Hauke BRUNKHORST et alii (Eds), Recht auf Menschenrechte: Menschenrechte, Demokratie und 
internationale Politik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt aM, 1999, pp. 216-227. James TULLY, Strange 
Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995 
44 There are 5 premises for the transformation of human rights into a subversive/insurgent 
cosmopolitan project: 1. Overcoming the universalism/relativism debate (trough intercultural 
dialogues about isomorphic concerns in that is converging preopcupations, even if seen from 
different worldviews and expressed in disparate languages – against universalism; criteria against 
relativism) and recognizing that: 2. All cultures have their own conceptions of human dignity, 
altought they aren’t necessarily formulated in terms of human-rights; 3. All cultures are cincomplete 
and problematic in their conceptions on human dignity; 4. No culture is monolytic; 5. All cultures 
tend to distribute people and grous between two competittive grous of herarchical belonging – 
equality and difference. We have the right to be treated as equals whenever difference makes us inferior, and the 
right to be treated as different when equality de-characterizes us. 
45 Bruno GALLINDO, Teoria Intercultural da Constituição (A Transformação Paradigmática da Teoria da 
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9. Not satisfied with the preceding theories, the Brazilian professor M. Neves 
commended an alternative approach, baptized as transconstitutionalism46. In his 
opinion, the conceptual galaxy of interconstitutionality is doubly restrictive. On the 
one hand, because it allegedly gives the impression that only horizontal relations 
between equal juridical orders are taken into account, therefore leaving untouched 
the essentials of the traditional constitutional paradigm47. On the other hand, for 
the reason that so embedded it was in its European context that it probability 
would prove useless if transplanted to any other environment. 
Transconstituionalism, in its turn, can be systematically exposed, closely 
following the arguments and formula of M. Neves.    
i. Notion.  
In the author’s own words, Transconstitutionalism designates the interlacing of 
diverse normative juridical orders, state or transnational ones, international and supranational 
around the same problems of constitutional nature - i.e., problems connected to /related 
with/concerning human rights and the limitation of power, which are discussed, at the same time, 
by courts pertaining to/integrated in different normative orders.  
 
ii. General framework.  
M. Neves never despised the constitution in its quality of basic instance for the 
normative self-foundation of the State as a territorial political and juridical 
organization. Nevertheless, from his perspective, even though the traditional state 
constitutional law, generally connected to a foundational text, cannot be dismissed, 
constitutionalism has opened itself and spread beyond state boundaries, not 
exactly because new non state constitutions emerge, but instead due to the fact 
that constitutional problems, especially those concerning human rights, cut across/ 
very different juridical orders, which operate in an interwoven sort of way in their 
search for solutions. 
Hence, transconstitutionalism must not be confused with other – seemingly 
similar - terms and concepts, such as international, transnational supranational, 
state or local constitutionalism. According to the author, the concept very clearly 
points out to the emergence and development of juridical problems, which cut 
across and run through very different types of juridical orders. Thus, a 
transconstitutional problem implies a question that can involve state, international, 
supranational and transnational courts, but, not the least, local juridical institutions. 
They work separately, each one striving in search of a solution, mainly due to the 
inexistence of rules defining attributions, competences and ambits of jurisdiction. 
In situations like these, whether there are no secondary rules to solve the conflict 
of competence among the several intervening courts, or, when existent, they are 
not consensually backed up by adjudicatory organs.  
 
iii. Typology.  
Supported by extensive examples M. Neves advances a typology of 
transconstitutional manifestations, which basically divides them into two groups. 
On the one hand, stands transconstitutionalism between two juridical orders, 
namely between state law and international law48, between supranational and state 
                    ___________________________ 
46 Marcelo NEVES, Transconstitucionalismo, Martins Fontes, São Paulo, 2009.  
47 Interconstitutionality would be nothing more than a constitutional conflict law, disregarding the 
late transformations this subject-matter has undergone. 
48 Internationalism and nationalism should be discarded as they represent a serious menace to human 
and fundamental rights. The examples of transconstitutionalism among international and state 
orders show us the need to overcome the parochial treatment of constitutional problems by the 




®UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 1, July 2015 
Z  
69                                                                                           Luís A. Malheiro Meneses do Vale 
 
 
law (EU), between state orders (illustrated by the debate in the USA), between 
state and transnational orders (lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex digitalis) and between 
juridical state orders and local extra-state ones (of native communities)49 
On the other hand, there is a more complex multi-angular 
transconstitutionalism between orders of the same species and orders of very 
different sorts, connected through a common reference to the same juridical 
problems and which has become a trademark of a worldwide multi-level and 
multi-centred juridical system characterized by tangled hierarchies (Hofstaedter)50.  
This is particularly evident in relation to what Marcelo Neves names the 
pluridimensional transconstitutionalism of human rights.  Controversies regarding 
human rights normally derive from the fact that diverse normative orders of the 
new juridical multi-levelled world system hold different understandings of 
questions about human rights, with some of them even denying the existence of 
universal human rights. In this context transconstituionalism gains a special 
significance, by cutting through different kinds of juridical orders, fostering 
cooperation and overcoming collisions at the same time.  
From this standpoint – and allow me to paraphrase the author - the most 
adequate path appears to be that of an engagement model, or better put, that of 
transversal entanglement between juridical orders, in such a way that each and every one of 
them will proclaim itself capable of permanent self-reconstruction through 
continuous learning by/with experiences from the other juridical orders also 
interested in solving the same juridical and constitutional problems of fundamental 
human rights. 
 
iv. Methodology.  
Transconstitutionalism stands out as the constitutional law of the future (sic), 
demanding an increased degree of interdisciplinarity, and, in that sense, asking for 
a specific methodology based on normative and cognitive openness, containment, 
communication and mutual learning, self-transformation and transversal 
rationality. 
Indeed, to absorb the original dissent, one must not ingenuously try to abandon 
or suppress identities, avoiding reciprocal blockages between conflicting or 
intertwined orders. On the contrary, constitutional identity is constantly 
reconstructed through ongoing dialectics with alterity. Methodically speaking, 
optimization clearly loses to self-restraint, not as an end in itself but as a 
consequence of double contingency and the capacity to be surprised by others, 
accepting an open future, which escapes predefinitions drawn by any of the orders 
involved (M. Neves). To strengthen its own capacity to offer reasonable solutions 
to common problems, each order should be ready to search for the other’s 
normative discoveries.  
Space is thus opened up for the development of a transversal rationality (imported 
– in a somehow counterfeited version - from W. Welsch) across the triadic 
relations between principles and rules (principle-principle, principle rule and rule-
rule). 
                    ___________________________                
because this to can cause mistakes when confronted with constitutional (namely human rights) 
questions 
49 The brasilian example of the Yanomami epythomises the dangers of succumbing to the 
temptation of human rights imperialism – invalid from an anthropological-political and 
anthropological juridical viewpoint, but, not less, from the specific point of view of one sensitive to 
transconstituionalism constitutional law.  
50 Notwithstanding the hierarchy of the different orders involved, the heterarchical relations among 
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This is a method of reciprocal stimulation of different orders towards self-
transformation able to make them more and more prone to constitutional 
dialogue. Neves sees it as the most adequate way to ensure the difficult passage 
from simple de-structured fragmentation to constructive differentiation, winning 
over definitive hierarchical methods (whether international, national, supranational, 
transnational or sub-national and local). Neither hierarchical methods nor sheer 
capitulation before fragmentation can offer satisfying solutions. The Brazilian 
professor ascertains that transconstitutionalism is expected to build transitional 
bridges, enabling more constructive relationships between juridical orders, by 
means of a pluridimensional articulation of their principles and rules in face of 
common juridical-constitutional problems, dependent on solutions which can be 
deemed bearable by all the orders involved, without relying on an ultimate 
authority or instance of decision. More than authority, transconstitutionalism 
claims for method (sic).  
 
v. Limits and possibilities of transconstituionalism.  
M. Neves cautiously tries to indicate the possibilities and limits of 
transconstitutionalism, taken as a response to the functional demands and the 
normative claims or pretences of today’s global society and in face of its empirical 
conditions of fulfilment and development.   
As for the latter ones, the diversified means/modes of relationship between the 
primary difference-code of law (in temporal, social, material and territorial 
dimensions) and the programs and juridical criteria of decision and solution, tends 
to highlight the asymmetries of legal forms, exposing the dangers of oppression it 
can represent for the weakest ones. 
From a functional-systemic point of view, concentrated on the relation between 
problems and solutions, Transconstitutionalism serves as a structural model of 
functional connection  between the functionally differentiated spheres of global 
society - beyond constitutional teleological utopia and sheer resignation in front of 
societal fragmentation - by promoting the stable structures required by a 
differentiated order of communications, transversally networked - which is to say, 
obtaining systemic integration, thus obviating normativist or realist overloads. 
With respect to the normative claim for counterfactual stabilization of 
expectations within the world society, transconstituionalism has the ambition of 
being and acting as a normative counterpoint whether in relation to the expansive 
social primacy of cognitive structures (economical, technical and scientific), 
whether with respect to the semantic of control of information and knowledge by 
the media, not incurring in the antipodal error of moral communitarianism. The 
alternative to hegemony cannot be the utopia of purely moral community, because 
the latter is based on social relationships of membership and solidarities around 
the sharing of common values - whereas from Neves’s point of view, what we find 
in social reality are systems of communications, games of languages, groups and 
persons very different from each other, in an heterogeneous confluence of 
interests, values, and expectations. Regardless of its subsisting communitarian 
formations, the global society cannot be portrayed as a political community, 
without provoking some serious theoretical and practical disasters. So what is to be 
demanded from society is not membership or community but promotion of 
generalized inclusion (access to the benefits of functional systems) or the reduction 
of the ever increasing primary exclusion.  
The different juridical orders entangled in the solution of a constitutional 
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other(s) so as to understand its own limits and possibilities, and therefore 
contribute to the solving of the problem My blind spot can be seen by the other51. 
 
10. Persuasive as it may be, we’re talking about one of the many (possible) 
points of view on the subject. Let us not forget, then, that transconstitutionalism 
can also lead, for example, to a broader notion of transculturality with objective 
(W. Welsh, M. Cannevacci) and subjective (N. Rouland, Sarhan Dhouib) facets.  
Effectively, aside from anthropological and sociological studies on transversal 
or common goods, values, principles, rules and institutions, we find prolific 
transcultural research on human rights, conducive to solidarity, in the words of 
Rouland52. The famous anthropologist defends a universal and transcultural 
declaration of human rights, praising Panikkar’s idea of homeomorphic notions of 
rights53. 
III. From Inter and Transculturality to Inter-and 
Transconstitutionalim (and back again…). 
Since this paper is not the occasion for a circumstantiated analysis of all the 
vexing questions thrown up by the aforementioned complex issues, I will only 
draft here the main lineaments for a possible theory of inter and transconstitutionality of 
inter and transcultural flavour, systematizing the materials conveyed, and leaving 
some hints for further studies54. The needed critical reflection on 
interconstitutional and transconstitutionalist main thesis will be put aside for the 
moment.       
 
11. I believe it would be advisable to start by comparing and distinguishing 
multi-, inter- and transculturality among themselves and in relation to their 
respective hypertrophies - multiculturalism, interculturalism and transculturalism – 
and then to proceed with an inventory of their implications at the philosophical, 
theoretical, methodological, dogmatic and practical levels of law.   
This would enable us, for example, to capture multiculturality’s attitude of 
homologation of the existing cultural differences55, under the cover of an (a-
critical) politics of recognition, always at the verge of sliding into multiculturalism 
and its passive acceptance or irresponsible celebration of entrenched collective 
identities (supposedly holistic, homogeneous and, in any case, internally opaque), 
organized within one society (and thus, in most cases, stately referred)56. 
Interculturality also proceeds from a conception of cultures as islands, but it can 
overcome it through inter-observation, intercommunication and interaction. 
Differences here give rise to conflicts, but also  conversations, due to the 
relationality underlying  the concept. 
                    ___________________________ 
51  I tend to agree with P. C. Rangel, preferring the use of the term transconstitutionality, which 
seems to evoke a framework narrative for the new problems challenging constitutional law and 
constitutional theory, instead of transconstituionalism, which apparently denounces the 
commitment to a particular  (and thus more narrow) perspective of solution, based on an 
historically located/situated concept of constitution. After all, constitutionalism designates a 
specific ideological and political movement, associated with a particular material concept of 
constitution - that is, a constitution with certain and particular content.  
52 Norbert ROULAND, Nos Confins do Direito, op. cit.  
53 For a glossary of the most important concepts of Panikkar’s work: http://www.raimon-
panikkar.org/ english/glossary.html 
54 See the references on note 1. 
55 The allegory of the salad bowl (instead of the melting pot).  
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Transculturality drives even further ; on one hand, it discusses the possibility of 
crossing borders, (cutting through cultures and internally interweaving them, 
according to Transversale Vernunft), and, on the other hand,  rediscovers and 
constitutes new limits and thresholds and enriches the transcendent tertia 
presupposed by comparisons and dialogues. 
Understandably, the preference for one of these perspectives will necessarily 
shape the way we conceive  the law’s existence, contents, enforcement, methods 
and rationality and also influences how we come to understand the juridical 
thought itself. To give an example, the first perspective will tend to depict law as a 
communitarian ethos, multiplied by the different cultural identities of a determined 
referential social and political space, thus forming a sum of parallel 
incommunicable orders articulated through a sheer principle of tolerance, with 
different values as substratum and substance, and enacted by disparate institutional 
authorities or social actors, according to their communities self-representation and 
conception of law’s methodology. It would be very different, however, to think 
about it as agonistically based, or built upon original consensus or cooperative 
processes of mutual understanding, dialogically structured and instantiated and 
dialectically enacted; not to mention, to consider it as the expression of transversal 
communalities, dialectically constitutive of horizontal subjectivities and transversal 
institutions.     
 
12. Leaving the multicultural paradigm aside, we should turn our attention to 
interculturality, using the works of Hamid Yousefi and Franz Zimmer57 as general 
background;  Special attention must be paid  firstly to an author to whom we owe 
one of the most complete and vehement attempts to elaborate on an intercultural 
paradigm, comprising several dimensions like Interkulturelle Geschichtstheorie, 
Interkulturelle Toleranz, Interkulturelle Kulturtheorie, Interkulturelle Religionswissenschaft, 
Interkulturelle Vernunft  and Interkulturelle Globalisierung. 
The analysis should be displayed along four parts: the first one dedicated to the 
juridically relevant features of interculturality - interoganizationality, 
interparadigmaticity, intertextuality, intersemioticy and internormativity; the 
second, dwelling into general internormativity; the third already circumscribed to 
interjuridicity, its mode of existence (validty and effectiveness), normative modalities 
(intersubjectivity and the interjusobjectivity); sources of law and juridical principles 
and diverse criteria (legal, judicial, doctrinal, social, etc.); the last one, would be 
devoted to interconstitutionality and particularly attentive to intersociality and 
interpublicity.  
After all, ours is a world of intensive and extensive networking organizations 
(economic, political, and social), with their own cultures, and very different cultural 
backgrounds; a world which texture is made of multilingual texts (especially in 
law), infinite local, regional, state, and universal narratives, world classics of 
literature, communities of interpretation and translation and so on. 
No wonder normativity itself tends to emerge as complex interweaving of 
principles and rules, orientations and patterns, standards and guidelines that we 
considerably abide to, in our social contexts and respective interactions.  
                    ___________________________ 
57 Franz ZIMMER, “Is Intercultural Philosophy a New Branch or a New Orientation in 
Philosophy?”, in Gregory D'SOUZA (ed.): Interculturality of Philosophy and Religion, National Biblical 
Catechetical and Liturgical Centre, Bangalore, 1996, pp. 45-57 
(http://homepage.univie.ac.at/franz.martin.wimmer /intpheng95.pdf); Hermann-Josef 
SCHEIDGEN/ Ina BRAUN, Interkulturalität – Wozu? Hamid Reza Yousefi und P. Gerdsen im Gespräch, 




®UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 1, July 2015 
Z  
73                                                                                           Luís A. Malheiro Meneses do Vale 
 
 
As for juridicity, the question arises when can it claim true cultural existence, in 
an intercultural scenario? What are its subjective and objective expressions, and 
how do they relate to one another, when they stand against an intercultural 
paradigm? Where does law come from? How do the juridical authorities from 
different contexts communicate? What is the meaning of legislative cooperation 
among states, of international judicial dialogue, of academic exchange? How do 
principles and criteria circulate among cultures and are gradually recognized, 
informing external and internal legal cultures and social practices in general? What 
is to say about methodological borrowings, importations, migrations, 
transliterations, translations, etc58?    
 
13. Interculturality, well understood, will take us to the transculturality 
paradigm, which, I believe, can give us important keys for the rediscovery of 
commonalities and the reinvention of solidarities. 
13.1. Transculturality59 refers to cultural mixing and interpenetration in a 
globally connected world, thus implying internal diversity, permeable borders, 
cultural blending and manifold cross-cultural interactions and linkages.   
Transculturality has gradually evolved from the description and assertion of 
cultural phenomena of horizontal borrowing, blending and bending60 to the reckoning 
of cross-cultural commonalities fostered by two quite different factors operating at 
different levels. One is the current process of permeation of cultures – a process 
creating commonalities by overcoming differences. The other is much older, and 
related to the human condition as such; the discovery of commonalities which 
precede and underlie all formation of difference61. 
As a matter of principle, transcultural experience and exchange cannot be 
understood without assuming something universal underlying cultural difference. 
In spite of that, we know that reference to cultural universals must reckon with 
cultural resistance, due to the unparalleled hegemony of difference thinking within 
                    ___________________________ 
58  Paul RICOEUR, “Il Paradigma della Traduzione”, in Ars Interpretandi, 2000, pp. 1 and ff.; 
François OST, Traduire - Défense et illustration du multilinguisme, Fayard, Paris, 2009; Tecla 
MAZZARESE, “Interpretazione e traduzione del diritto nello spazio giuridico globale”, in Diritto 
& Questione Pubbliche, n.8, 2008, pp. 88-101; Vlad PERJU, “Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, 
and Migrations”, in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers. Paper 360. 2012;  Michele GRAZIADEI, 
“Legal transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge“, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 10, pp. 
693-714; Sieglinde E. POMMER, “Translation as Intercultural Transfer: The Case of Law”, in 
SKASE - Journal of Translation and Interpretation [online], 2008, vol. 3, no. 1; Mark RADHERT, 
“Comparative Constitutional Advocacy”, in American University Law Review, Vol. 56, 3, pp. 553-665; 
Vicki JACKSON, “Constitution as «Living Trees»? Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Interpretive Metaphors”, in Fordham Law Review, Vol. 75, pp. 921-960; Peter HÄBERLE, 
Rechtsvergleichung im Krafktfeld des Verfassungsstaates. Methoden und Inhalte, Kleinstaaten und 
Entwicklungsländer, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1992; Peer ZUMBANSEN/ Russel A. MILLER, 
Comparative Law as Transnational Law. A Decade of the German Law Journal, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2011; Anne PETTERS, “Universalist Assumptions and Implications of Comparative Law 
– Should They be Deconstructed?”, in THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Hrsg.), Proceedings of the 93rd Annual Meeting, Washington D.C., 1999, pp. 366-369. 
59 The idea of transculturality has obtained increasing aknowledgment and acceptance in a myriad 
of regional, national, international, supranational and transnational fora, namely in connection with 
human rights issues.       
60 Alasdayr PENNYCOCK, Global Englishes and Transcultural Flows, Routledge, London & New 
York, 2007. 
61 Wolfgang WELSCH, “On Acquisition and Possession of Commonalities”, Lecture delivered on 
the occasion of the ASNEL Conference "Transcultural English Studies" at Wolfgang Goethe 
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the cultural studies environment62. And, in fact, if differences do not vanish, its 
mode of being is certainly modified. Transculturality does not end up in global 
uniformity, it rather improves and increases cultural diversity. Differences are 
continuously being overcome and produced, by transgression of boundaries, 
negotiation of limits, and transfiguration of realities.   
We are talking about an ongoing never-ending process of dialogue between 
identity and alterity, as well as resemblances and differences, whereby transcultural 
orientations provide a first set of commonalities and, on this basis, allow for the 
development of subsequent commonalities, in a dynamic of possession and 
acquisition of transcultural commonalities. In other words: transcultural 
intersections lead to an initial acquisition of commonalities, and the possession of 
these consequently enable further acquisitions. This increased possibility for 
exchange and coming to terms with each other obviously represents a great 
advantage in a transcultural constitution. 
At the macro-level, as a result of the increasing interpenetration of cultures, 
there is no longer anything absolutely foreign and nothing exclusively one’s own; 
however, strangeness, alienation and otherness obviously remain, giving an all new 
meaning to the appeals of hospitality and commensality. Meanwhile at the micro-
level, human beings also become cultural hybrids due to the increasingly 
transcultural process of formation to which they are submitted. 
The conditions seem gathered for the elaboration of somewhat innovative 
philosophies of the subject and the practical realm (politics, society and law), 
offering some new interesting insights into action, rationality, normativity, actors 
and agents.  
However, to make sense of transculturalism, we have to precise its notion and 
meaning, to set it apart from confining realities or categories63, and to account for 
(and organize) its main figures and tropes:   Transparadigmaticity, Transliteration, 
Translation, Transnationality, Transculture, Transgression, Transversality, 
Transrationality, Transsubjectivity, Transcendentality, Transcendence, 
Transculturality, Transnormativity, Transformation, Transjuridicity, Transtheory, 
etc64. 
                    ___________________________ 
62 IBIDEM. See also: Wolfgang WELSCH, “Transculturality - the Puzzling Form of Cultures 
Today” in Mike FEATHERSONE/ Scott LASH (Eds.), Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World, Sage, 
London, 1999, pp. 194-213; IDEM, “Was ist eigentlich Transkulturalität?” in Lucyna 
DAROWSKA/ Claudia MACHOLD (Hrsg), Hochschule als transkultureller Raum? Beiträge zu Kultur, 
Bildung und Differenz, transcript-Verlag, 2009. 
63 Like F. Ortiz trans-culturation, other, general, cross-cultural references, or transnational studies and 
phenomena – besides mere interculturality. Afef Benessaieh distinguishes tranculturation from a-
culturation, de-culturation and neo-culturation - Afef BENESSAIEH, “Multiculturalism, Interculturality, 
Transculturality”, in Afef BENESSAIEH (Dir./Ed.), Amériques Transcultureeles – Transcultural 
Americas, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 2010.  
64 With a special concern for the diversity of contributions convoked, v. Sarhan DHOUIB, “Von 
der interkulturellen Vermittlung zur Transkulturalität der Menschenrechte”, in Hans Jörg 
SANDKÜHLER (Hrsg.), Recht und Kultur. Menschenrechte und Rechtskulturen in transkultureller 
Perspektive, Frankfurt [u.a.], Peter Lang, 2011, pp. 155-178; Andreas HEPP, “Transculturality as a 
Perspective: Researching Media Cultures Comparatively”, in Forum Qualitative Social Research, 
Volume 10, No 1, Art. 26, January 2009; Robert PÜTZ, “Culture and Entrepeneurship – remarks 
on Transculturality as Practice”, in Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie, Volume 94, Issue 5, pp. 
554-563, December, 2003 (consultado on-line); Transtext(e)s, Transcultures 
(http://transtexts.revues.org/index .html); Werner DELANOY/Alpen ADRIA, “From ‘inter’ to 
‘trans’ or quo vadis cultural learning?”, in M. EISENMANN/ Th. SUMMER (Hrsg.), Basic Issues in 
EFL Teaching and Learning, Universitätsverlag Winter Gmbh, Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 157-167; 
Massimo CANEVACCI, “Transculturalidade, interculturalidade e sincretismo”, in concinnitas, ano 
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If we want to theorise transculturality, and draw juridical consequences of it, the 
semantic cloud speaks volumes about the difficulties of the endeavour. Some ideas 
are worthwhile to highlight. Thus, while some authors emphasise subversion or 
assimilation, Pennycock65 praises the transgressive and transformational effect of cross-
cultural mixing and Schulze-Engler addresses the transgressive and transcendent in 
transcultural thought66.  
13.2. Walking this road, listening about new forms of transcendence, trans 
subjectivities, or the horizontal comparisons which presuppose and constantly re-
create the pertinent tertia comparationis, we may reassume our intermediate 
hypothesis, about the possible transcultural dimensions of law’s fundamentals and 
foundations, constitution and existence, dogmatic stabilization and practical 
enactment.   
Law produces transculturality, has its own transculturality, and is certainly a 
product of transculturality – axiological, epistemological and ontic-ontological. 
Transcultural subjects of (and subjected to) law, transcultural problems, 
transcultural assumptions, not to mention the convergence to (and trough) 
transculturally revealed transcendence (and transcultural principles and criteria), 
demand maturate investigation and reflection.   
The works of M. Neves, Gomes Canotilho and others are of extreme help and 
should constitute our starting point. 
Nevertheless, some cautions are to be borne in mind from the beginning67, so 
as to prevent the misinterpretation of misleading clues, left along the roughly 
sketched (and quickly glimpsed) tracks of the research. Hence, it is important to 
stress that, in spite of all the hybridization, culture and law do not go without 
limits and boundaries, differentiation, codes, and programmes (just and unjust, 
valid and invalid, licit and illicit, etc). The point, however, is that the practical 
institutionalization of those limits and lines of the nomos no longer coincides with a 
particular territorial culture. If the anthropological cronotopology is essential, the 
cybermetamorphosis of man, which enables him to participate in new levels of reality, 
widens the space of the possible claiming for new boundaries - anthropologically 
cultural (product of human autonomy) but also - more and more intrinsically - 
inter and transcultural.  
The experience of the other, the imagination of the different, the projection to 
the not yet (E. Bloch) provide guidance, ensuring law’s continuous dynamism and 
openness, notwithstanding (rather due to) its permanent working of division, 
distribution, attribution and commission. From a constitutional perspective, this is 
the work of institutionalizing the conditions for human capability, according to 
ideas of justice.  
                    ___________________________                
home: Transculturality trough literature”, in Proceedings of CAIR10, the first Conference on Applied 
Interculturality Research, Graz, Austria, 7-10 2010; Chielozona EZE, “Cosmopolitan Solidarity: 
Negotiating Transculturality in Contemporary Nigerian Novels”, in English in Africa, Vol. 32, No. 1, 
May, 2005, pp. 99-112. 
65 Alasdayr PENNYCOCK, Global Englishes and Transcultural Flows, op. cit.  
66 Franz SCHULZE-ENGLER, “Introduction”, in Franz SCHULZE-ENGLER/ Sissy HELFF, 
Transcultural English Studies: Theories, Fictions, Realities (Volume 12 ASNEL PAPERS), Rodopi, 2009, 
pp. ix-xvi.; 
67 This is not the place nor the time to develop this point. However, it already goes without saying 
that such a conspicuous mobilization of culture and law can easily be hijacked and become an 
instrument of ideological manipulation  or acting as an indiscussed strategy of foundation-
legitimation of the status quo of globalization, able to inhibit or block radical critical reflection and 
advocacy towards emancipatory social transformation. No wonder the use of transculturality, 
translegality and transconstitutionality tropes can be under suspicion; effectively, it should never 
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Not surprisingly, for Canotilho, interconstituionality as interculturality is 
fostered by inter-organizative texts towards egalitarian and universal cohesion, 
marked by symbolic belongings like the membership and participation in a 
community of free, equal and autonomous individuals; W. Welsh speaks about 
human rights transculturality and Terry Eagleton reminds us that common 
cultures, namely common social institutions, do not imply cultural uniformity.  
If we don’t want inter- and transcultural adjectives and adverbs to become mere 
disguises for law’s deference to the hegemonic powers of economy (within a 
rhetorical strategy aimed at the legitimation of the status quo), our intellectual and 
practical efforts will have to be shifted to the other side of the moon - imagining, 
uncovering, and implementing the social, political and juridical solidarities (around 
social justice claims), produced or propitiated by globalization, therefore exploring 
their countervailing or counterhegemonic potential of correction and gradual 
transformation of the real (and its layers of reality).  
Perhaps public institutions and new public services, committed to the realization of 
social rights, can regain their breath with the new winds blowing from the 
doctrinal reflections on the commons, the theories of global goods or the discourses 
concerning social services of general interest68.        
For the moment, our aspirations run a little lower. Our time was scarce, thus we 
had to resign ourselves to a few theoretical considerations and some purposive and 
critical-reconstitutive hints.  
However, to those who rapidly demise social justice projects, especially 
transnational ones, with labels of onirism, one can certainly reply – for it is always 
timely - recalling what William Butler Yeats wrote, in 1914, under the self-
description of "an epigraph from an old play.": “In dreams begins responsibility.”  
And so it is, indeed, even if – as I keep reminding in some of my writings - the 











                    ___________________________ 
68 The enthusiasm with more ambitious expressions, like global constitutionalism, is currently mirrored 
in several works and publications.  
